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Despite the fact that women in certain coun-
tries gained the right to vote over a century ago, 
their under-representation in the elected bodies 
at both national and sub-national level persi-
stently remains a dominant feature in almost all 
countries in the world. Suffragettes’ struggle con-
centrated primarily on women’s right to vote and 
to stand for election while little attention was paid 
to the issue of the actual number of women to be 
elected to political office. Relative avoidance of 
this issue was partly caused by their expectation 
that larger portion of the elected women will lo-
gically follow the extension of the full legal rights 
of citizenship to women. However, current stati-
stics of women in politics clearly show that such 
expectations are yet to be fulfilled. As Phillips 
notes, although background changes in society - 
such as improved educational and labour market 
participation of women - do have effect, deve-
lopments in most of the countries exposes that 
rapid improvement in the number of the elected 
women depends on deliberate choice, especi-
ally on the adoption of positive measures such 
as quotas (Phillips, 1995: 59). Thus, feminists 
currently need to tackle somewhat different set 
of issues than the suffragettes - in the context 
of women’s formal equality to men; their actual 
inequality needs to be addressed. Descriptive 
or gender parity in representation is being pro-
posed as one way of overcoming the inequality. 
Interestingly enough, both demands for vote and 
those for gender parity in representation seem to 
produce and to revolve around “sameness” vs. 
“difference” dilemma. The debate over the que-
stion whether women are and should be treated 
as same or different than men, thus proves to be 
the longest and arguably irresolvable in theory 
and practice of feminism.1 
1 For an overview of the continuity of this dilemma and con-
nections of contemporary debates with those of suffrag-
ettes see Scott, 1996 and Williams, 1998 for accounts of 
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In the following essay, I will argue that in 
providing the arguments for gender parity in 
representation, feminists did not and could not 
manage to escape from implying the difference 
between men and women. However, I will also 
try to show that by invoking the difference, some 
arguments seem to be more suitable for avoid-
ing the essentialism implicit in the notion of wom-
en’s difference.
The first part of the essay will examine those 
arguments that appeal to principles of justice be-
tween sexes, with special emphasis laid on the 
way they were called forth in the French parité 
movement. It will be suggested that despite the 
efforts to build the case for parity on universal-
istic grounds and avoid the invocation of differ-
ence, this was undermined by two factors: the 
very problematic of sex/gender distinction and 
the failure to fully connect these issues to a 
broader discussion related to the normative ex-
pectations of a democratic process and political 
representation.
In addressing these issues, the second part 
of the essay will briefly summarise a distinction 
between three normative models of democracy 
– liberal, republican and deliberative (Habermas, 
1996) - and relate them to arguments for de-
scriptive representation of women. I will try to 
demonstrate that the types of arguments put for-
ward for gender parity in representation depend 
on, and are shaped by, the normative model of 
democracy that we have adopted. Although nei-
ther of these models allows argumentation which 
evades the invocation of difference between men 
and women, I will argue that deliberative model 
manages to move further away from essential-
izing the difference than the other two.
2. Gender Parity – The Justice Argument
Presumably the most effective and straight-
forward argument for gender parity in represen-
tation is one pleading to justice between the 
sexes. Arguing that political equality, of which 
an important part is parity in political represen-
tation, is necessary if justice is to be achieved, 
has almost the immediate appeal. Moreover, this 
argument tries to operate within the terms of uni-
versalistic and individualist discourse and avoids 
invocation of difference between the sexes by 
maintaining that women are same as men in 
their (in)abilities as well as in their political inter-
ests, beliefs and values. It is precisely because 
women are same as men, as well as considering 
that they make half of the human population, that 
we should expect their equal presence in the 
representative body. The fact that it is not so is 
then immediately regarded as evidence of men’s 
unfair monopolization of political representation. 
The stance was most strongly upheld by advo-
cates of parité movement in France. In France 
an earlier attempt in 1982 to introduce the law 
which would allow the maximum of 75% of either 
sex in municipal elections was blocked by the 
Constitutional Council. The Council argued that 
quotas divide the French citizens into catego-
ries and are thereby contrary to the indivisibility 
and universality of citizenship as major pillars 
of French democracy. Introducing quotas was 
widely regarded as seriously undermining the 
notion of citizenry as united and homogeneous 
body. In such context it is clear why in the nine-
ties parity movement in France, rather than ad-
hering to the language of difference as feminist 
movements elsewhere, adopted the language of 
universality and equality. Haase-Dubosc (2000: 
3855) points to this contrast while comparing 
France and India, noticing that “India (is) being 
involved in the politics of diversity and peripheries 
and France in the politics of sameness and cent-
ers”. Parity advocates thus argued that women 
are not and cannot be treated as category since 
they constitute the half of world population and, 
as such, encompass all categories. For this rea-
son requests for full equality in representation 
replaced the previous ones for quotas. Women 
were not to be seen as special group whose in-
terests need to be taken into account through 
mechanisms of quotas but as half of human-
ity whose underrepresentation compromises the 
value of French universalism. Such framing of 
the issue made the principle of equality between 
sexes central to the wider democratic project and, 
in Geneviève Fraisse’s words, enabled parity to 
operate as Trojan horse for quotas (see Baudi-
no, 2003). Parity advocates thus argued for the 
law which will guarantee the equal number of 
women in representative body as a way of elimi-
nating the present discrimination and achieving 
a true universalism.2 As Françoise Collin points: 
“It is paradoxical, but interesting to argue that it 
was universalism that best maintained the sexu-
alisation of power, and that parity attempts, by 
contrast, to desexualize power by extending it to 
both sexes. Parity would thus be the true univer-
salism” (Collin, cited in Scott, 1997: 11).
Although appealing, parité argument faces 
two challenges. The first comes from gender the-
ory and revolves around sex/gender distinction. 
2 For a detailed account of parité movement, see Scott, 
2005.
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Scott claims that parité argument was not about 
nature/culture or sex/gender distinction that has 
been used and deconstructed in American femi-
nism because “no inherent meaning was attrib-
uted to anatomical duality“ (Scott, 2004: 42) and 
biology was also considered as cultural. But, it 
is by no way clear how this argument escapes, 
for instance, Butler’s charge „that one way the 
internal stability and binary frame for sex is ef-
fectively secured is by casting the duality of sex 
in a prediscursive domain“ (1998: 280). It be-
comes then by no means accidental or surpris-
ing that the parité arguments were soon appropri-
ated in a way that brought up the heteronormative 
framework of complementaries of the sexes (see 
especially Agacinski, 2001). Moreover, Lépinard 
(2007) claims that this made parité advocates 
entrapped in the equality/difference dilemma in a 
way that does not allow thinking about multiple 
differences – such as race, ethnicity or sexuality. 
Scott also admits that although advocates of par-
ity disagreed with Irigaray’s assertion of women’s 
sexual singularity there is much similarity in their 
arguments. The statement that since all humans 
come in two sexes and that anatomical duality of 
individuals - regardless of whatever other distinc-
tions they may have - is universal fact correlates 
with Irigaray’s claim that “sexual difference is 
doubtless the most adequate content of the uni-
versal…The entire human species is composed 
of women and men and is composed of nothing 
else. The racial problem is in fact a secondary 
problem” (Irigaray, cited in Scott, 1997: 11-12). 
However, if we remain strictly in the arena of ana-
tomical difference, race can become relevant fac-
tor for representation on the same premises. The 
fact that nobody even wants to argue for special 
representation of black people based on their dif-
ferent anatomy, and that nobody is worried about 
equal representation of, for example, blue-eyed 
and brown-eyed men, speaks for itself.3  What 
is more at issue here is, of course, that the de-
mand for parity appealing to principle of justice 
3 However, if we would prefer to continue with the rea-
soning, we can say that, in contrast to women (if we put 
aside the issue of transsexuals), it is more difficult for the 
purposes of political representation to clearly demarcate 
who is black due to the large number of people who are 
of multiracial descent. Equally can be said, though, that 
if it is a matter of justice to represent equally anatomi-
cal differences, we should not retreat just because of the 
practical difficulties. Absurdity of this position is not just 
related to the unwillingness to consider anatomy as a rel-
evant ground for representation, but also to the aware-
ness that race is, above all, a cultural category. Failure 
to apply the same standard to category of sex testifies 
to probably more deeply rooted essentialist assumptions 
surrounding sexual differences. 
depends, as Phillips (1995: 64) notes, on “…
feminist analysis of the sexual division of labour 
as ‘unnatural’ and unjust...Justice requires us to 
eliminate discrimination (this is already implied in 
the notion of justice), but the argument for wom-
en’s equal representation in politics depends on 
that further ingredient which establishes structur-
al discrimination”. If we acknowledge the reason-
ing, les paritaires were not able to bypass the 
problem of evoking the structural difference be-
tween men and women. In this light, the failure to 
equally problematize the structural disadvantage 
of other groups leads to prioritization of gender 
over any other difference and becomes more 
susceptible to charges of “differentialism”. 
The second challenge to parité argument is 
more concerned with lack of theorization of pub-
lic sphere and democratic political process that 
comes with relying solely on the appeal to justice. 
Phillips (1995: 62) quite rightly points out that this 
argument then becomes parallel to those aimed 
at establishing parity in education and employ-
ment “with little sense of what makes political 
representation different from either of these”. 
Even though parité movement was specific in 
being firmly rooted in the values of French repub-
licanism and its corresponding normative model 
of democracy, little time was spent on true en-
gagement with these issues. The problem was 
rather “to make women plausible representa-
tives of the nation” and “claiming the equal right 
of women to represent humanity” (Scott, 2004: 
42). The argument to a certain extent, especially 
if combined with the parity advocates’ reasoning 
that the law has the power to alter the symbolic 
structures that underline the organization of the 
society, resembles the “role model” argument. Let 
us consider, for instance, Mansbridge’s (1999) 
statement: “I agree that social relations among 
and between groups can have major effects on 
individual identity…Yet I consider of even greater 
importance the effect of the social meaning on the 
perceptions and actions of members of the more 
advantaged groups”. However, this argument, 
even to a lesser extent, attempts to provide the 
account of what makes the political sphere dis-
tinctive in relation to education or employment. 
Apart from the abstract humanity, what should 
women, as well as men actually represent: in-
terest, values, identities, perspectives? To parité 
advocates the purpose of political representa-
tion and the nature of processes it demands has 
been a secondary question. 
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3. Gender Parity and Normative Models of 
Democracy
In order to address this issue, the following 
part of the essay will argue that questions such 
as those about the purpose of politics and how 
we envision political process are the ones that 
need to be dealt with in order to make claims 
for representation of women plausible. I will use 
the distinction between liberal, republican and 
deliberative models of democracy as a way of 
approaching these questions and argue that 
each has a significant bearing on the type of ar-
guments we put forward for the case of gender 
parity as well as on our understanding of differ-
ences between men and women.
3.1. Liberal Democracy
According to the liberal view, there are two 
sources of a social integration: on the one hand, 
decentralized regulation of the market, and on 
the other, the hierarchical regulation of the state. 
Society is thus understood as a field of interac-
tions among individuals oriented towards the 
pursuit of their private interests while the state 
is imagined as a government apparatus whose 
purpose is the use of administrative power. In 
such a structure, purpose of politics as citizens’ 
will-formation is to aggregate private interests 
in order to direct the government action to the 
achievement of the society’s common goals. 
The nature of the democratic process similarly 
resembles the logic of the market. Citizens’ pref-
erences, as expressed by the act of voting, fol-
low the structure of their choices in the market, 
while political parties are strategically oriented to 
accommodate their programs and candidates to 
win the majority of votes and thus acquire the 
positions of power (Habermas, 1996).
The liberal view on democracy bears on the 
argument for gender parity in representation in 
two specific ways. First, by laying emphasis on 
politics as representation of private interests, it 
requires us that we establish the existence of 
specific women’s interests that could, in turn, be 
accordingly represented. Nevertheless, the no-
tion of a distinctively women’s interest has been 
seriously contested in feminist theory.  Gender 
intersects with other categories, such as class, 
race, ethnicity, religion, or sexuality and each 
of them can equally weight on the formation of 
interests and preferences of women. This di-
vergence is present even in preferences relat-
ed to issues of reproduction and child care, for 
which it should be relatively safe to assume that 
are stemming from experiences and conditions 
shared by and specific to women as a group. If 
we look, for instance, at the par excellence femi-
nist issue, that of reproductive rights and right 
to abortion in particular, we can see that women 
are frequently at the front of both pro life and 
pro choice advocacy groups. Here, often reli-
gion intersects with gender in a way that does 
not allow us to talk about unified women interest. 
Similarly, class can have a significant bearing on 
another important feminist issue, that of a paid 
parental leave. Here, policies aimed to reduce 
the inequality between man and women may 
reinforce the inequality among women. By both 
maintaining their standard of living and reducing 
their inequality to women with higher earnings, 
entitlement fixed at or even above the national 
minimum wage can be more preferable option 
for women with low incomes. Women with higher 
salaries, by contrast, are more likely to opt for 
the entitlement related to their previous earn-
ings. The problem can be partially resolved by 
trying to define women’s interests negatively, that 
is in relation to men’s interest. Phillips (1995: 68) 
thus argues that: “…the variety of women’s in-
terests does not refute the claim that interests 
are gendered…The argument from interest does 
not depend on establishing a unified interest of 
all women: it depends, rather, on establishing a 
difference between the interests of women and 
men.”4 Looking from this perspective, the fact 
that women do not have the same position on 
abortion or parental leave does not mean that 
the policy regulating it will not affect women’s 
and men’s interests differently. While such un-
derstanding of gender interest allows us to in-
voke a concept of difference between men and 
women that is still capable of treating the latter 
as heterogeneous category, the question wheth-
er gender parity is necessary or would it actually 
ensure representation of such divergent inter-
ests still remains unsolved.
This question requires us to consider the sec-
ond problem that liberal view of politics poses 
for the gender parity argument - its treatment 
of interests as an unproblematic and clear cat-
egory. If we accept that there are specific gender 
interests, liberal model of politics requires these 
interests to be translated into voting and policy 
preferences. In that case, there is no reason 
why should only women politicians be capable 
of responding to interests expressed in such 
way and it is of no concern to us who is actually 
working on their pursuit. As Phillips notes (1996: 
4 For a similar account on the difference between wom-
en’s and gender interests, see Molyneux, 1985.
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140): “Even the notion of interests, which seems 
most thoroughly grounded in differential material 
conditions, lends itself to at least semidetach-
ment…The interests of pensioners or the long- 
term unemployed can then be championed by 
those who are neither retired nor out of work; the 
interests of geographical localities can be repre-
sented by people who no longer live in the area; 
the interests of mothers with young children can 
be represented by childless men.” Arguments for 
gender parity within the liberal model of democ-
racy thus have to allow for certain ambiguity in 
defining interests and assume that expressed 
preferences often diverge from the real ones ei-
ther because they are based on adaptive choic-
es (Nussbaum, 2001) or because the certain 
issues have been absent from political agenda. 
This is what impelled Mansbridge (1999: 644) to 
argue for descriptive representation in the con-
texts of uncrystallized interests: “When interests 
are uncrystallized, the best way to have one’s 
most substantive interests represented is often 
to choose a representative whose descriptive 
characteristic match one’s own on the issues 
one expect to emerge”. Mansbridge also wants 
to keep “some distinction between surface pref-
erences (or prereflective understanding) and un-
derstandings that are more considered” (1996: 
61) while avoiding conceptions of interests that 
connote some objective, given state which can 
be revealed and discovered. This is why she de-
fines interest as “deliberatively considered con-
clusion on a policy preference”, a conclusion that 
may equally be self-interested or public-spirited 
(Mansbridge, 1996: 61). This deliberative char-
acteristic allows us to treat interests as not 
fixed or stable but open to contest and change, 
a change which is often played out in political 
struggle. Ensuring gender parity in representa-
tion would thus mean ensuring that women’s 
voice will be heard when interests are (re)de-
fined in political process.
Apart from conceptual difficulties in differen-
tiating interests from values or liberal from delib-
erative view on preferences, the argumentation 
can be disputable for several other interconnect-
ed reasons. First, unless we are ready to assume 
that women’s representatives are some kind of 
avant-garde of women, there are no mecha-
nisms to discern and establish legitimacy of rep-
resentatives elected on such premises. Ramsay 
(2003: 77), for instance, explores Le Doeuff’s ac-
cusation of gender parity cause as non-feminist 
and her warning against “placing confidence in 
patrician women” based on the fact that the “larg-
est women’s group in France, Action Catholique 
Général Féminine with its 35,000 members, fol-
lowed the Pope on the issues of contraception.” 
Are we going to blame this group for not ad-
equately crystallizing women’s interests? This, 
among many, example provokes more general 
question: how can we be sure what the women 
representatives will stand for and on what ac-
count can we hold them responsible for failing 
to represent or betraying women’s interests? 
Second, the idea of existence of adaptive pref-
erences and uncrystallized interests, even if we 
do not understand interests as some objectively 
given reality, when combined with the absence 
of accountability, can hardly avoid the resem-
blance to the notions of “false consciousness”. 
Third, closely related, and for the purpose of this 
essay most important reason for the problematic 
nature of the argument, is that it assumes that 
women are, rather than men, capable of “crys-
tallizing” these interests when issues emerge on 
political agenda. But as Phillips (1995: 71) puts 
it: “If the interests of women are varied, or not yet 
fully formed, how do the women elected know 
what the women who elected them want?”. To 
claim that they actually will know, and moreo-
ver, know it better than men, presumes the dif-
ference between men and women that comes 
much closer to essentialism than merely assum-
ing that women can share some interest based 
on their gender. In this regard, Lépinard (2007: 
378) is right to claim that “…the implementation 
of gender quotas always holds the risk of essen-
tialisation”.
3.2. Republican Democracy
According to the republican view, besides 
market and the state, there is solidarity as the 
third and even most important source of social 
integration. Citizens are understood as mem-
bers of ethical community who are aware of 
their mutual dependence and strive to further 
develop their relations of reciprocal recognition. 
Within such constellation, purpose of politics is 
much more than mere mediation between pri-
vate interests and government apparatus. Rather, 
since democratic will-formation has the function 
of constituting a society as political community, 
politics becomes constitutive of the society as a 
whole. Citizens’ political rights, through commu-
nicative practice of self-legislation, enable them 
to become authors of such community. Legitima-
cy of the state then depends not on its “protec-
tion of equal private rights, but in the guarantee 
of an inclusive opinion” (Habermas, 1996: 22). 
Correspondingly, nature of the political process 
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does not follow the logic of the market – will-for-
mation does not result from simple expressions, 
aggregation and bargaining of interests. Rather 
it follows from public communication whose goal 
is the achievement of mutual understanding. For 
these reasons, “this dialogic conception imagi-
nes politics as a contestations over question of 
value, and not simple questions of preference” 
(Habermas, 1996: 23).
Arguing for gender parity in political repre-
sentation within republican model of democracy 
usually requires us to evoke gender difference in 
two ways. Since in the republican vision of politics 
strong importance is being placed on the achieve-
ment of mutual understanding through dialogue, 
first argument lays emphasis on what can be de-
noted as political style. Women are said to be 
more cooperative, oriented to avoidance of con-
flict and devoted to reaching an agreement. Sec-
ond argument deals with the republican concern 
with ethical content of the political and stresses 
the significance of substantive values that women 
are supposed to carry. The argument is prob-
ably as long as the history of feminism. Williams 
(1998: 125), for instance, claims that “A particu-
larly common justification for women suffrage 
was that women constituted distinct moral force 
in society. The argument rested on the claim that 
women had higher moral standards than men”. 
The more contemporary version of the argu-
ment, rather than asserting women superiority in 
relation to the common moral standards, rests on 
the notion that women tend to develop different 
type of moral reasoning. The claim mostly draws 
on Gilligan (1997), who argued that women have 
different moral voice and that traditional “ethics 
of justice” is biased in favoring male subjects 
and male concerns. Whereas “ethics of justice” 
gives prominence to talk of rights, rules and ab-
stract principles, women cultivate “ethics of care” 
which is preoccupied with the care, responsibil-
ity, and the concrete. Although Gilligan’s work is 
related to moral psychology, it was taken up by 
some feminists in political theory, usually named 
maternal feminists, in their effort to delineate 
distinctively feminist vision of politics (see Elsh-
tain, 1998; Ruddick, 1989). According to mater-
nal feminists, female morality and ethics of care 
represent equally valid or even superior forms 
of ethical way of being, and they insist that con-
ceptions of power, politics and citizenship should 
be informed by virtues of mothering – that is, by 
love, compassion and empathy.
There are two major challenges to these 
propositions. The first challenge is that it is aim-
ing to introduce into political arena values and 
relationships that are not appropriate for the pub-
lic sphere (see Dietz, 1998). However, ethics of 
care does not have to be seen as the exclusive 
product and extension of mothering and private 
sphere - it resonates with the communitarian 
sense of “encumbered self” (Sandel, 1998) and 
with contextual moral theories more broadly (see 
Tronto, 1987: 656-663). Feminists have also 
pointed that the distinction between the ethics of 
justice and ethics of care, as well as between 
universalistic and contextual moral theories, has 
often been overstated. Consequently, appropri-
ateness of each for exclusively private or public 
sphere may also be called into question. Okin 
(1989), for example, reconstructs Rawls’ theory 
of justice by placing care, responsibility and con-
cern for others in its centre, rather than viewing 
it as overtly rationalistic, abstract and individual-
istic. She argues that those in original position 
“cannot think from the position of nobody…, they 
must think from the position of everybody, in the 
sense of each in turn.” (Okin, 1989: 244) To do 
that they require strong empathy and benevo-
lence, capacity to listen, relate to and care for 
others. These arguments are important because 
they soften the divide between public/male and 
private/female moral reasoning. In that way, they 
move us further away from differentialism im-
plied by too close connection between ethics of 
care and family or motherhood.
The second challenge points to potential dan-
ger of essentializing the women’s difference that 
comes with invoking specific women’s virtues or 
women’ different moral voice. However, there 
are two ways of minimizing the risk. We do not 
have to accept that women’s inclination for the 
“ethics of care” stems from their biological and 
natural role as mothers. It will be enough to es-
tablish that women and men in contemporary so-
cieties do share different responsibility for care 
work and that this fact can and does affect their 
values and priorities. Chodorow’s psychoanalytic 
account (1978) suggests that children tend to de-
velop relational sense of self and maintain close 
nurturing relationships because of their early at-
tachment to the primary caretaker. Since children 
form stronger attachments to primary caretakers 
of the same sex, most of which are female, girls 
tend to develop these characteristic on a larger 
scale. Hartsock’s (1998) historical materialist ac-
count emphasises the importance of systematic, 
structural differences between men’s and wom-
en’s lives. Sexual division of labor particularly in-
fluences the development of female construction 
of self in relation to others, their valuation of the 
concrete and connectedness to others and natu-
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ral world. Also, ethics of care does not have to 
be conceived as originating in women’s position 
within the family. Rather than accepting essen-
tially women’s moral voice, Tronto (1987) places 
caring form of moral reasoning into the realm of 
social marginalization and experiences of subor-
dination, evidence of which can be found in Gil-
ligan’s own work. Uncertainty and fear about the 
appropriateness of making moral judgments can 
impede women from taking moral stands. Such 
fears stem from their lack of power rather than 
mothering role. This questioning of the proposed 
link between care ethics and gender allows us to 
broaden its scope and connect it to experienc-
es of other marginalized groups. If so, ethics of 
care can no longer be understood as exclusively 
female arena. Stacks (1986), indeed, in her cri-
tique of Gilligan, argues that African- Americans 
invoke similar model of moral development and 
that ethics of care can be equally considered as 
characteristically black. Collins (1989: 770) fur-
ther argues that African-American women expe-
rience “a convergence of values from Afrocentric 
and female institutions” which forms the basis for 
development of specific black feminist thought. 
Such focus gives rise to identity politics that is 
able to include multitude of women’s experienc-
es and multiple axes of oppression.5 While this 
makes the feminist claims about the oppression 
of women founded in a notion of shared experi-
ence and identity less viable it still does not de-
prive us of the possibility to evoke women as the 
group for the purpose of political representation. 
As Tronto (1987: 663) notes: “Whether the cause 
of the gender difference in morality is a psycho-
logical artefact of femininity, a cultural product of 
caretaking activity, or a positional result of social 
subordination, it is difficult to imagine how any of 
this causes, or some combination of them could 
affect all individuals equally.” Recognizing multi-
ple identities among women can only help us to 
dislodge the sameness/difference dilemma in a 
way that will allow us to acknowledge the differ-
ence while avoiding their positioning within some 
essential female attributes.
3.3. Deliberative Democracy
According to Habermas, deliberative democ-
racy tries to combine liberal and republican tradi-
tion and to refigure them in a new way. In simi-
larity with liberal model, deliberative democracy 
5 For the early statement of such identity politics see Com-
bahee River Collective Statement, available at http://his-
toryisaweapon.com/defcon1/combrivercoll.html (accessed 
12 October 2011)
keeps the boundaries between the society and 
the state. But, in contrast to it, civil society re-
mains autonomous and distinct from both econ-
omy and the administration. In that regard, it 
moves beyond the liberal understanding of citi-
zens as individual, self-interested actors and the 
corresponding, aggregative view of democratic 
will-formation. Deliberative democracy gains its 
distinctive form in that it works with the “high-
er-level intersubjectivity of communication pro-
cesses that flow through both the parliamentary 
bodies and the informal networks of the public 
sphere” (Habermas, 1996: 28). Like the repub-
lican model, it keeps the understanding of de-
mocracy as the institutionalization of the public 
use of reason. But in contrast to “ethical over-
load” of republican theory which “requires the 
reference to a concrete, substantively integrated 
ethical community”, it divorces politics from the 
notions of collectively acting citizenry, oriented 
towards “self-explication of a shared form of life 
or collective identity” (Habermas, 1996: 22-24). 
Rather, deliberative democracy depends on the 
institutionalization of procedures and conditions 
of communication while its normative content 
lies in the very structure of communication. It is 
not merely the number of people supporting de-
cision nor the community’s prior shared under-
standing that ensure its normative justification. 
As Benhabib (1996: 72) states, under delibera-
tive model, agreement is thought to be fair and 
rational because decision agreed upon by the 
large number of people on following rational pro-
cedures of communication has a presumptive 
claim to be rational. Such a decision can then 
always be challenged through the same delib-
erative procedure.
Deliberative democracy bears on the issue 
of women’s difference in somewhat contradic-
tory way. On the one hand, since the process of 
deliberation would be rather futile among peo-
ple who are basically the same, deliberative de-
mocracy implies the difference at its very core. 
Manin (1987: 352) thus argues that deliberative 
principle requires not only participation of all but 
the existence of multiple and conflicting points of 
view. Benhabib (1996: 71), following Manin, em-
phasises that one of the functions of deliberative 
processes is to impart information. This is crucial 
for the rationality of the process as no single indi-
vidual can poses all the relevant information nor 
anticipate all the perspectives through which par-
ticular issues can be perceived by different indi-
viduals. Difference can, thus, truly be seen as a 
resource for democratic communication (Young, 
1997). For these reasons, to argue for gender 
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parity in representation within deliberative model 
of democracy, we need to invoke difference be-
tween men and women that depends less on the 
divergence of interest and values (although we 
do not have to exclude those) and more on what 
Young appropriately terms perspective. Young 
(1997: 383-389) disagrees with critics such as 
Gitlin and Elshtain who reduce politics of differ-
ence to the interest-group politics. At the same 
time she is very careful to distance herself from 
the essentialist understandings of groups which 
ascribe them characteristics that determine and 
define the individual identities of their members. 
Nevertheless, in her dissociation of the politics of 
difference from the politics of identity, she is not 
prepared to dispense with the notion of groups 
altogether. In her opinion, social groups should 
be understood in relational terms – “what con-
stitutes a social group is not internal to the at-
tributes and self-understanding of its members. 
Rather, what makes the group a group is the re-
lation in which it stands to others” (Young, 1997: 
389). Young argues for group representation as 
a mode of overcoming the exclusion of certain 
perspectives from political process. According 
to Young (2000: 136) social perspective arises 
from a distinctive position in social field in a way 
that “agents who are “close” in the social field 
have a similar point of view on the field… Each 
social perspective is particular and partial with 
respect to the whole social field, and from each 
perspective some aspect of reality of social pro-
cesses are more visible than others”.6 This does 
not imply that somebody who is not a member 
of a group cannot view social reality from a per-
spective of that group seeing that deliberative 
politics exactly aims at communicating views to 
others. Neither does it imply that members of a 
group will have the same interpretation of the is-
sues or will advocate the same outcomes – it is 
more about “which particular social events and 
issues are interpreted” (Young, 2000: 139) and 
what are the starting points for discussion. Rath-
er, argument for women representatives (as well 
as for the representation of other groups) comes 
from their ability to relate to and understand ex-
periences of women with more immediacy then 
it would be possible to others.
However, “difference friendly” character of 
deliberative democracy needs to be taken with 
precaution. As Gould (1996: 172) notices: “Di-
versity may be the original condition of a poly-
vocal discourse but univocity is its normative 
principle…the telos of the discourse, what char-
6 For a view of the impossibility of a clear distinction be-
tween perspectives and interests see Williams, 1998: 125.
acterises its aim and method, is agreement”. For 
this reason we should not just look at the formal 
inclusion of particular groups in public arena, 
but also at the very processes of deliberative in-
teraction within it. Fraser (1990: 63-65) argues 
that the idea of public sphere requires us to 
bracket social inequalities in a way in which par-
ticipants in discussion proceed as if they were 
social and economic equals. However, the pub-
lic sphere cannot in any way be separated from 
the larger societal context; it cannot be “a place 
of zero degree culture”. If societal context is per-
meated with structural inequalities, these will be 
reflected in deliberative processes of the public 
sphere as well. Feminist research has pointed 
out that women’s voices are often excluded even 
when women are present in deliberative forum 
- women speak less than men and are more of-
ten interrupted and ignored. The prospect of their 
perspective being taken into account is in this 
way seriously undermined. Fraser thus argues 
that, rather than bracketing social inequalities as 
if they did not matter, we should better strive at 
the public sphere where they will be explicitly 
thematized and eliminated. Sanders (1997) ad-
ditionally points out that commitment to eliminate 
structural inequities alone may not be sufficient 
to eliminate patterns of inequality in deliberative 
process. Even if we equalize income, education 
and time – the recourses needed for delibera-
tion – we may still be confronted with privileges 
and prejudices which are “too sneaky, invisible 
and pernicious for that reasonable process” and 
which, therefore, cannot be combated with the 
reasoned argument (Sanders, 1997: 353). Quite 
the opposite – restricting democratic discussion 
to an argument that is rational, moderate and ca-
pable of connecting particular to the general may 
even work to further exacerbate present hierar-
chies by universalizing the views of the domi-
nant groups and silencing the oppressed. Young 
(1996) similarly notices that focusing on argu-
ment carries implicit cultural biases that privilege 
speaking styles of better-educated white middle-
class men. It may then be necessary to expand 
the notion of democratic discussion to include 
other forms of speech.7 While Sanders prefers 
testimony as a model which better allows for 
the expression of different perspectives, Young, 
beside storytelling, also includes greeting and 
rhetoric. These arguments emphasize different 
speech cultures of men and women. However, 
particular speech culture is not an inherent char-
7 For this reason Young (1996: 124-125) prefers the term 
communicative and Dryzek (2002) discursive democra-
cy above the deliberative.
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acteristic of a group divorced from its relation to 
unequal social positions of men and women: “dif-
ferences of speech privilege correlate with other 
differences of social privilege” (Young, 1996: 124).
Feminists have also questioned deliberative 
democracy’s relation to difference since con-
sensus and agreement are usually perceived as 
goals of democratic discussion (Young, 1996; 
Gould, 1996). If the public sphere is situated 
within the context marked by structural inequali-
ties and the goal of deliberative discussion is 
reaching consensus or agreement, there is a 
clear danger that the perspectives of dominant 
groups will subsume those of the disadvantaged 
ones under the disguise of unity. For Fraser 
(1990) this problem is further exacerbated with 
the focus on the public arena in the singular. 
Rather, we should embrace the existence of the 
“subaltern counterpublics”. She concludes that 
“in stratified societies, arrangements that ac-
commodate contestation among a plurality of 
competing publics better promote the ideal of 
participatory parity than does the single, compre-
hensive, overarching public” (Fraser, 1990: 66).8 
Such decentered, differentiated public sphere may 
work to soften the tension between the need to 
represent a group and the need to be bounded 
only by what is heard in deliberative process 
(Phillips, 1995: 151). In this way, we can keep 
the category of women open and plural while not 
dispensing with the legitimacy of democratic dis-
cussion.
Although women’s perspective argument is 
based on establishing a difference between men 
and women, its appeal lies in its straightforward 
link to the women’s social and structural posi-
tion. Moreover, while it depends less on the artic-
ulation of specific outcomes or norms for which 
women representatives should stand for, when 
situated within (revised) deliberative democracy 
frame, it adequately deals with the issue of le-
gitimacy. In this way, it moves further away from 
essentializing women’s difference than the argu-
ments of interests and values do.
8 Mansbridge (1996) picks up on Fraser’s insistence on 
“subaltern counterpublics” but understands their rele-
vance for any context since no democratic polity can dis-
solve the ongoing disagreements nor attain the full legit-
imacy. In that way she is closer to Honig’s (1996) treat-
ment of difference and Mouffe’s (2000) understanding of 
radical democracy grounded in agonistic pluralism.
4. Conclusion
The essay has examined different arguments 
put forward for gender parity in representation 
and the ways in which they relate to the issue of 
women difference. It has been argued that estab-
lishing the difference between men and women 
is necessary in order to make the case for par-
ity - for, as Scott (2007: 154) asks: “if we are all 
the same, why has sexual difference been such 
an obstacle to real equality?” However, it is not 
necessary to present this difference in essential-
ist terms since each of the arguments introduced 
can be articulated in a way that does not depend 
on the assertion of some essential female attri-
butes. Rather, how we understand the difference 
will more significantly depend on the normative 
model of democracy we are arguing for, as well 
as on our interpretation of the distinctiveness of 
women’s current social position.
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Feminizam i demokracija: 
Stoje li žene iza ženskih predstavnica?
NIKOLINA JOŽANC
Centar za politološka istraživanja, Zagreb
Ovaj članak proučava zahtjeve za rodnim paritetom u političkom predstavljanju 
te načine na koji oni odgovaraju na česte optužbe za esencijalizam koji je impli-
citan takvim zahtjevima. Prvi dio dotiče se argumenata koji su pokušali izbjeći 
evociranje razlike muškaraca i žena jednostavnim apeliranjem na pravdu među 
spolovima. Tvrdi se kako su ti argumenti, osim što nisu uspjeli ostati u okvirima 
univerzalističkog diskursa, također propustili odgovoriti na normativne zahtjeve 
demokratskog procesa. Drugi dio istražuje načine na koje su različiti normativni 
modeli demokracije – liberalni, republikanski i deliberativni – formulirali argumen-
te za rodni paritet te na koji način su oni povezani s pitanjem ženske različitosti. 
Premda argumenti temeljeni na svakom od triju modela polaze od razlike muš-
karaca i žena, pokazali su se, do neke mjere, uspješni u izbjegavanju zamke 
esencijalizma.
Ključne riječi: rodni paritet, političko predstavljanje, normativni modeli 
demokracije, esencijalizam
